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Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the short-run and long-run effects of corporate tax
changes over the last three decades and the likely consequences of proposed
future tax changes. Consideration of short-run effects of tax reform on invest-
ment and market value requires a careful analysis of three elements of behavior
that are normally omitted from long run analyses: the state of investor expec-
tations, the time lags involved in putting new capital in place, and the tax
law's distinctions between new and old capital. The model described in this
paper considers investment in equipment and investment in plant separately, and
does so under different specifications of investor expectations.
Our results for the period 1954—1985 suggest that investors did take
account of fluctuations in profitability, real interest rates, and the tax code
in making their investment plans. We examine the consequences of the
nonindexation of depreciation benefits as well as the introduction of the
investment tax credit and the Accelerated Cost Recovery System by simulating the
corporate sector's performance in the absence of these features. In addition,
we analyze the effects of changing the tax code in 1986 along the lines proposed
in the Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax" plan, the Treasury II plan, and the
Rostenkowski plan, H.R. 3838. The simulation results suggest that all three
plans would reduce fixed investment in the short run, with the reduction coming
primarily in equipment. At the same time, the simulations predict large wind-
falls for existing capital assets under all three reform proposals.
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Since 1981, important changes in the Federal tax provisions affecting
investment in business plant and equipment have occurred in every year except
1983. There is every reason to believe that 1986 will not be another
exception. Yet the methods economists commonly use to measure the impacts of
tax law changes generally assume that such changes will be permanent and
ignore problems of transition. Such analysis can be valuable for
understanding the underlying differences among alternative tax systems, but
may be unhelpful, even misleading, if one is attempting to understand the
short-run impact on investment of a tax change that may have been anticipated
and may be foreseen as temporary.
The purpose of this paper is to present and use a framework for tax
analysis that is closely related to previous approaches but capable of
assessing the short-run impact on investment of very complicated combinations
of tax policies undertaken at specified dates with different degrees of
anticipation on the part of investors. At the same time, the model generates
predictions about the impact of these changes on the market value of
corporate securities that are consistent with the predicted path of
investment.
Because the model's parameters are based on empirical evidence for the
U.S., its predictions are not simply illustrative, but should convey an
impression of the actual quantitative effects of tax policy changes. Being an
historical model, based on data beginning in 1953, it also allows us to
perform counterfactual experiments to estimate the effects of historical
policies. Thus, we can (and do) evaluate the performance of the activist tax—2-
policy of the last three decades in altering the level and stability of
investment over that period.
Another primary objective, however, concerns the future. In the past
couple of years, numerous tax reform plans have surfaced that would make
important changes in the incentives for business fixed investment. Most would
rationalize the treatment of depreciation for different types of assets,
remove the investment tax credit, and compensate, at least in part, for the
reduction -in these investment incentives through reductions in the statuary
corporate tax rate. Among the most influential such plans have been the
Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax" (originally formulated in 1983), the first and
second Treasury plans (introduced in November 1984 and May 1985), and the
"Rostenkowski" plan formulated by the House Ways and Means Committee and
passed by the full House in January, 1986.
Each of these plans has been greeted with mixed but predominantly
negative responses from the business community, with the primary criticism
being that they would reduce investment. The analysis below evaluates these
criticisms by estimating the marginal effects of several of the proposals on
the level and distribution of investment and the value of the stock market.
An interesting point that surfaces in this analysis is that even to the extent
that such plans may harm investment, they should be very beneficial for the
value of corporate equity. It is thus somewhat ironic that they should be so
vehemently opposed by many of those who would appear to benefit.
Before turning to these results we describe the model used in this
paper, based on that developed in Auerbach and Hines (1986), and the choice of
parameter values used for the simulations.-3-
Modelling Investment Behavior
The model of investment used in this paper assumes that there are two types
of fixed investment (structures and equipment) and costs to adjusting the
capital stock that may be separate or mutual and may differ between structures
and equipment. It is, in other words, a q investment model with two types of
capital. We choose this level of aggregation to allow comparability with
previous work, and because the greatest variation in tax treatment has
historically been between these two broad classes of assets.
Consistent with the data, ours is a discrete time model with one year
intervals. Each capital good is assumed to decay exponentially, and the
representative, competitive firm produces its output using labor and the two
types of capital subject to a constant returns to scale, Cobb—Douglas production
function, with a1 and a2 representing the gross shares (including depreciation)
of the equipment and structures, respectively, in production. The adjustment




where'it and K1t are net investment and capital of type -i-in year t, and
Kt are sums over both types of investment and capital, and 13,, and 132 are
adjustment cost terms reflecting joint costs and costs specific to the two
types of capital, respectively.
Given the homogeneity of the production function and adjustment cost
function with respect to the scale of the firm, the value of the firm will be
proportional to the size of its capital stock and the behavior of all firms can-4-.
be represented by a single, aggregate representative firm.
The quadratic adjustment cost function in (1) is a two—capital-good version
of the one used by Summers (1981) in his empirical analysis. It also differs in
two other respects. First, it is based on net, rather than gross investment.
Second, there is no constant subtracted from the ratio I/K in each quadratic
term. However, one may equivalently view the current model as being based on
gross investment, with a constant equal to the rate, o, of economic depreciation
being subtracted. Either way, the notion is that minimum average adjustment
costs (in this case, zero) occur when net investment is zero. This makes sense
-if one views the costs as general ones involving changing the scale of
operations rather than bolting down the new machines. Summers's preferred
estimate of the constant term (.088) is quite consistent with this
interpretation.
We ignore changes in relative prices between capital goods and output and
between different types of capital, and assume that all new investment goods
have a real price of unity in every year. The adjustment costs are assumed to
be "internal", in that they relate not to an upward sloping supply schedule for
capital goods but the costs of absorption at the firm level. This is consistent
with the observation that historical fluctuations in capital goods prices are
relatively minor compared to estimated costs of adjustment.
The firm's optimization problem consists of choosing equipment, structures
and labor at each time t, taking account of current and (to the extent of the
assumed planning horizon) future economic conditions. There is no risk from the
firm's point of view; whatever it expects about the future (right or wrong) is
expected with certainty. If we let the production function -in the three factorinputs be F(.), then the firm seeks to maximize its value at time t, equal to
the discounted value of its real, after—tax cash flows:
(2) Vt =5t(1+_+lt(1_T÷i) is,K2s,N) -wN)-
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where is the labor input in period s, r is the real, after—tax required
return, w is the real wage rate paid at the end of year s, D(s,x) is the
depreciation allowance at the beginning of year s for assets of type i
purchased at the beginning of year x, kt -is the investment tax credit
received on investment of type I at the beginning of year t, it is the rate of
inflation, 6 is the rate at which capital of type I depreciates, G1 is gross
investment of type 'I at the beginning of year t, andTt is the tax rate at the
beginning of year t.2 Depreciation allowances decay at the inflation rate
because they are not indexed.
We use the convention that year t investment occurs at the beginning of the
period, while quasirents occur at the end, with period t investment yielding its
first return at the end of the same period. We also assume that adjustment
costs are immediately expensed, as would be the case for internal adjustment
costs that require extra factors or reduce productivity. Gross and net
investment of type i are related by the identity:—6-
(3) =1it
+óKt_1
For labor, the optimal condition derived by differentiating (2) with
respect to N calls for the firm to set the marginal product of labor equal to
the real wage. As usual in models of this sort with constant returns to scale,
the labor demand equation is omitted from explicit analysis. For each type of
capital good i, it is most convenient to derive the first order condition with
respect to gross investment at each date t, Assuming, for the moment, an
infinite horizon and perfect foresight, this yields:
(4) pit =[(1)/(1_Tt+i)]
-(l_o)t)(1+r)_(5t+1)(1_T1)p15] s=t+1
where (using 1 and 3):





isthe "total" marginal product of capital at the end of period t, taking
account of reduced concurrent costs of adjustment, and q is the marginal




Equation(5) reminds the reader that there are two components to the firm's
marginal value of an additional piece of capital this year: the marginal product
of capital (dFt+1/dK1t) and the reduction in next year's adjustment costs
(dAti/dKt). Expression (4) says that firms should invest in capital of type I
at date t until its marginal product, after tax, equals its after tax cost
(multiplied by (1+r) because costs are borne at the beginning of the period)
less the present value of investment credits, depreciation allowances and future
quasirents. Thus, the expression is the result of the optimal backward solution
for firm behavior. When expectations are static, as is commonly assumed, (4)
reduces to the standard user cost of capital formula:
(7) pit =
wherez equals the present value of depreciation allowances D1(s,t) and
(8) q' =
isa tax-adjusted price of new capital goods that we will interpret below.
Because of the assumption that production is governed by a Cobb—Douglas






where a is the production function constant. Thus, given the optimal choice
of labor input, expressions (4) and (5) for I and j give us two equations in-8-
the capital stocks Kit and K2t. Without adjustment costs, this would permit a
closed form, backward solution for these capital stocks in each period.3
However, since depends on lagged capital stocks, this solution method is no
longer possible, and we must resort to simulation analysis.
Parameter I zat ion
Three types of parameters appear in the model just described, relating to
production (a, a1, a2, ö2, 1, and taxation (T, k1, k2, and
D2(•)) and financial markets (r and it).For it, we use the realized values of
the GNP deflator (year on year), while r is set equal to the statutory corporate
tax rate that prevailed for the majority of the year.4 Firms' required rate of
return, r, -is set equal to after-tax real rate on 4- to 6-month commercial paper
which prevailed in the year of investment, plus a risk premium that is taken to
be constant. This series on adjusted interest rates was calcualted by (10):
(10) ra =0.06+ (1—T)PR -INFL
where ra is the adjusted rate, PR -is the nominal (annualized) return on 4— to
6-month paper, and INFL is the contemporaneous inflation rate. The after-tax
risk premium -in (10) is 696, which roughly corresponds to the historical
difference between after-tax risk-free interest rates and after-tax profit
rates.
In order to calculate the production paramaters a and 6 and the tax terms k
and D(.), it is necessary to aggregate data on thirty—four classes of assets
for which we have data (twenty equipment and fourteen structures) into
corresponding values for aggregate equipment and structures. This turns out to-9-
be a very complex problem. The method used is described in the appendix.
Once values of and 2 are known, it 'is possible to estimate the capital
share parameters a1 and a2 from production and capital stock data. We begin by
calculating the net—of-depreciation, before-tax return to capital in the
corporate sector in 1977 by dividing the difference between value added and
labor compensation in the corporate sector, taken from the 1977 Census of
Manufactures, by the total corporate capital stock, equal to equipment and
structures plus inventories and land. We then assume that all forms of capital
earned this before—tax rate of return, Rg5 Next, we assume that the
Cobb-Douglas production function specified above refers to gross output net of







where V is value added and K3 and K4 are stocks of inventories and land.
Once we have obtained this value of G, we note that, since output is
observed net of adjustment costs, the production function F(.) must satisfy:
(12) F(K11K2,N) =G+A(1)
Finally, we define the net return to capital of type i (i=1,2) in the current
period as being the derivative of 6 with respect to K1, holding constant the
capital stock growth rates (11/K1), (12/K2) and (I/K), less depreciation a1.7





which can immediately be solved for a1.8




with the estimated value of Rg equal to 10.4. This estimate of the marginal
product of capital (which is used only in the calculation of a1 and a2) is
consistent with previous findings. In interpreting the sizes of the two share
coefficients, it should be remembered that these are shares in gross output,
less estimated returns to land and inventories. Relative to usual
calculations of the capital share of net output, the first of these factors
(the use of gross output) would lead to a larger total share (since
depreciation is included in both numerator and denominator) while the second
(excluding part of the capital stock) would lead to a smaller total share
(since returns to excluded capital are subtracted from both numerator and
denominator.)
The production function constant a -is obtained for 1977 by dividing
F(.) by the product of its component factors raised to the power of their
respective factor shares. We then assume that the labor input, in efficiency
units, grows at a constant rate of 3 over the entire sample period.9This
imparts a trend rate of growth to the steady state of the model. That it is
slightly below the historical capital stock growth rate of about 4 may be
because part of that growth is attributable to the historical decline in
effective tax rates on investment.
In order to obtain an historical series for a that would be consistent—11—
with observed fluctuations in the profitability of capital, we use data on
after-tax corporate rates of return from Feldstein, et. al. (1983), updated to
include 1984. We took the 1984 value to prevail for all subsequent years.
Assuming capital market equilibrium and constant returns technology, this rate
of return will be equal to the marginal gross return to capital,Rg in (13).
Note that this methodology implicitly assumes that yearly variation in the
return to capital is attributable to shocks to the production function and not
to changes in the capital/labor ratio. Then, using (9) and (13), the




wherethe left side of (14) is the value to be calculated, and C and D are





where s1 is the share of capital of type I in the capital stock (s1 +s21).
Since (14) is a relationship which holds for all years, it must hold for
1977, the year from which values are calibrated. Marginal products of capital
for all other years were calculated where is usinga1 and a2 and the






The only parameters that remain to be chosen are the adjustment costs terms
and 2' which are quite crucial to our analysis. Previous studies have
inferred these parameters from regressions of investment on "tax—adjusted q".
The authors of these studies have derived "tax-adjusted q" by correcting the
ratio of the market value of the firm to its capital stock (presumed to be
average q) for tax factors such as the investment tax credit, accelerated
depreciation and the deductibility of adjustment costs that would cause marginal
and average q to differ. In one case (Abel and Blanchard (1986)), average q is
explicity estimated from projected future profits and interest rates. A
regression of I on adjusted q can then be interpreted as estimating the inverted
marginal cost function.
In a model with one capital stock, the coefficient on adjusted q would be
an estimate of 1/a, the inverted marginal adjustment cost. Although such
regressions cannot be done if there is more than one capital stock, one can
still interpret the coefficient as the inverse of the sum of marginal adjustment
costs associated with investment of type i, or in the current model.
Empirical investigations have found this coefficient to be quite small.
However, for many reasons usually pointed out by authors of the previous studies
themselves, these coefficients (which are not always even statistically
significant) may be prone to serious downward bias because of an inexact measure
of q being used.1°
Given the uncertainty of what the "true" values of and should be,—13—
we choose values that, given the other parameters of the model, make the
variances of the growth rates of investment in equipment, structures and the two
categories together that are generated by an historical simulation with perfect
foresight roughly equal to their historical values for the period 1954-1984.
While this methodology is somewhat arbitrary, it derives from the observation
that, in the simulations, fluctuations in investment are particularly sensitive
to the configuration of adjustment costs.
Postwar investment history suggests that adjustment costs are substantial
and not symmetric between equipment and structures. The net stock of equipment
grew at a mean annual rate of 5.O between 1954 and 1984, while structures grew
3.19 annually and total capital grew at a 3.9 rate. The historical variances
of equipment, structures, and total net investment rates were .O41, .OO7O, and
.O12 respectively. Adjustment cost parameters for the simulations were cho-
sen to approximate as closely as possible these variances with those generated
by the perfect foresight simulation when investors expect the 1985 tax law to
stay unchanged forever. Choosing .I3,and to equal the common value of
six, as in Auerbach and Hines (1986), produces investment variability that does
not conform well with the historical evidence: structures investment is too
variable in these runs and equipment investment not variable enough. On the
basis of experiments with several parameterizat-lons, we found that the values
13o15,=O, producedresults which most closely mirrored actual
investment. This specification of adjustment costs yields equipment, struc-
tures, and total investment variances equal to .O35, .OO67, and .O12
respect ively. 11
To compare these chosen values of and to those found in the pre-—14—
viousliterature on aggregate investment, note that the value of 13
corresponding to a dollar increase in net investment proportional to the
weights of equipment and structures in the capital stock is: 13=
wherek is the fraction of the capital stock represented by capital of type 1.
Given typical values of k1 and k2, this yields a value of 13approximately
equal to 28, which is quite reasonable given previous research.12
Solution of the Model
In the presence of adjustment costs, the model as specified can only be
solved numerically. There exist different techniques to obtain such solutions.
The one used here is described in great detail in Auerbach and Hines (1986).
All simulations begin with the assumption that, prior to 1954, the economy
was in a steady state: that economic conditions had been stable for sufficiently
long that the stocks of both kinds of capital had completely adjusted, and no
change in these conditions was anticipated. Though this is undoubtedly
inaccurate, some such assumption is required to fix the irrital values of capital
stocks in a way that is consistent with the assumed production technology.
This solution for the steady state in 1953 does not depend on any future
variables. Indeed, when expectations are assumed to be completely myopic
throughout, the model can then be solved forward without iteration, with each
year's solution beginning with and solving for Kt. At the other extreme is
the assumption of perfect foresight. By this, we mean that all tax and
inflation rates are correctly anticipated until the present. It is hard to
implement this assumption for future dates, so we make assumptions about the
values of these variables and suppose that firms' expectations match them. We—15—
then solve the model into the 21st century to guarantee convergence to a new
steady state.
Measuring the Effects of Policies
In addition to the two capital stocks, we calculate three variables of
interest. One is the average q of the representative firm, its value relative
to the replacement cost of its capital stock. This starts with the marginal q
obtained directly from the adjustment cost function, and then takes account of
the variety of tax provisions that make old and new capital differ in value.
The second is the effective tax rate, which summarizes the incentive to invest
in a particular asset in a given year. The third is the net investment flows of
equipment and structures which the simulation generates.
Estimating Average q
It is this variable that tells us what the overall impact of a tax change
will be on market value. Generally, there will be two effects. To the extent
that the incentive to invest increases, marginal q, defined to be the basic
price of a unit of capital capital plus the derivative of the adjustment cost
function with respect to investment, will rise. In the absence of taxes, the
homogeneity of production and adjustment cost functions would imply that this
would also be the firm's value per unit of capital.
But to the extent that the new incentive magnifies the distinction between
new and old capital, the difference between marginal q and average q will also
rise. The net effect on average q can be either positive or negative for
expansionary or contractionary policies. Holding marginal q constant, an-16-
increase in average q may be viewed as a lump sum transfer to the owners of
corporate capital.
The formula for average q is based on an arbitrage condition between old
and new capital. Since new capital goods must generate after-tax cash flows





where is marginal q and PV is the present value of the after—tax
quasirents accruing to an new asset purchased for one dollar at date t. Since
capital purchased at t'<t has a present value of quasirents of (l_oi)ttPVjt,
it follows that its value at date t, per efficiency unit of capital, is:
(18) +
Solutionof (17) for PV and substitution of this expression into (18) gives
a solution for the value of capital of type i and cohort t' at time t, in
terms of From (1) and the definition of marginal q, we also have:
(19) =1+o(It/Kt)
+
Combining(18) and (19) to get each cohort's value, we then aggregate these
values of average q over all vintages and both types of capital to obtain an
overall value for the firm at date t.
Note that this expression for average q is consistent with the assumption
of perfect foresight. When myopic expectations are assumed, we change (17) and
(18) correspondingly.—17—
Calculating Effective Tax Rates
In models based on myopic expectations, it is common to define the
effective tax rate to be the percentage difference between the net (of
depreciation) marginal products of capital before and after taxes. Given a
fixed after-tax return, this calculation also tells us what the before tax, or
social return to capital must be for the firm to earn zero profits. Unless the
economy actually is in a steady state, however, this will be correct only in the
year the calculation is made. Hence, the effective tax rate as commonly used
measures the required before-tax return to capital in the same year, assuming
myopia.
When firms are not myopic, the formula for the user cost of capital is
different, but we can still answer the same question, viz., what rate of return
on capital must the firm earn in the current year, taking account of future
changes in taxes, inflation and the firm's marginal product of capital? As
before, this will tell us what the firm's rate of return on investment must be,
before taxes, in the current year. Dropping subsrcripts, the effective tax rate
is defined to be:
(20) 9 =[(p/q-6)-r]/(p/q-6)
where p is the marginal product of capital defined in (5)
It is not clear which value of q should be used in (20). The most obvious
candidate is marginal q, as defined in expression (19). However, use of this
value has the effect of incorporating the tax deduction for adjustment costs in
the effective tax rate. This is perfectly acceptable; -it reflects the fact that-18-
part of the cost of investment is expensed. However, it makes more difficult a
comparison with previous results, since even when there is economic depreciation
of direct capital costs, the effective tax rate will be less than T. By using
the tax adjusted value, q', defined in (8),13 one "undoes" the differential tax
treatment of adjustment costs, and obtains the usual results for expensing,
economic depreciation, and other special cases. Hence, for the sake of
comparability with other studies in which adjustment costs were ignored, we take
this latter approach.-19-
Simulation Results
This section presents the results of simulations, chosen to provide
answers to some of the questions raised in the introduction.We begin by
contrasting the historical patterns of net investment in equipment and
structures with net investment series produced by simulation runs using myopic
and perfect foresight assumptions about investor expectations of future tax
laws and macroeconomic conditions.
Table 1. presents net corporate investment, expressed as a fraction of the
capital stock, in equipment and structures for the period 1953-1984. These
investment rates are not derived from the published BEA net investment series;
they are calculated by applying the BEA gross investment data and
Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates to form a perpetual inventory of corporate
capital assuming the published 1925 net capital stock to be accurate. The
investment series produced by thi.s method are then measured consistently with
net investment calculations from the simulation runs.
Table 1 illustrates several sharp features of the postwar investment
experience. Equipment investment strongly accelerates in the mid-1960's,
possibly -in part in response to the introduction of the investment tax credit
and repeal of the Long amendment. Both equipment and structures appear to be
affected by business cycle downturns in 1970-1971 and 1975-1976. Structures
never recover from the latter shock. Investment in every year of the post-1975
period fails to equal any of its previous values.
Tables 2 and 3 present results from simulations in which investors have
myopic expectations and perfect expectations respectively. The main point is-20-
to illustrate the effects of expectations on the smoothing of investment and
the impact that movements in marginal q have onaverage q when adjustment
costs are present. Both simulations are performed for the period 1953—1990,
under the assumption that Congress passes no post-1985 tax reformproposals and
investors (in the perfect foresight simulation) correctly anticipate that there
will be no changes.
Table 2a and 3a present effective tax rates for these two simula-
tions. For each year, there are two numbers: the effective tax rates for
equipment and structures, respectively. These results are quite consistent
with those of the previous literature.
Since effective tax rates depend not
only on the tax treatment of new investment, but also on macroeconomic
conditions and investment adjustment Costs, a casual examination of effective
tax rates does not reveal all the incentives built into the tax code.
Effective tax rates may be useful for purposes of comparison, however.
Beginning from effective tax rates in 1953 well above the statutory
rate of 52 for equipment, and somewhat lower for structures, effective tax
rates for the myopic simulation in Table 2a move lower with the taxchanges
introduced in 1954, and again in 1962 with the introduction of the investment
tax credit. Tax rates on equipment go down again in 1972 with the reintroduc-
tion of the investment tax credit and the introduction of the AssetDepreciation
Range (ADR) System. Effective tax rates for equipment and structures move
strongly -in 1975 for reasons to be discussed shortly. By 1980, higher rates of
inflation have pushed effective tax rates back up to earlier levels,par-
ticularly on equipment. The introduction of ACRS in 1981 brought effective tax
rates on equipment essentially to zero, also lowering tax rates on structures to—21—
a postwar low. Reduced inflation in 1982 brought tax rates down still further.
Rates went up in 1983 on equipment and 1984 on structures because of the 1982
and 1984 tax acts, which introduced a fifty percent basis adjustment for the
investment tax credit and an eighteen year (instead of fifteen year) tax life
for structures, respectively.
The net investment rates for equipment, structures, and aggregate capital
are displayed in Table 2b, expressed as a percentage of the respective capital
stocks. The substantial adjustment costs built into the model have the effect
of raising marginal q when investment tax incentives are strong, thereby
encouraging firms to smooth their investment. Despite this effect, the
investment series in Table 2b is highly erratic. The variance of structures
investment is almost ten times its historical value, and episodes such as the
introduction of the investment tax credit in 1962 and its removal at the end
of the 1960's produce unrealitsically sharp investment changes.
Years such as 1975 illustrate some of the hazards of modelling investment
behavior under myopic expectations. Net structures investment in the model is
15 that year, and equipment investment is -3. These incongruous results are
produced by the economy's deep recession that year and the accompanying low
real interest rates and marginal products of capital. The enormous decline in
real interest rates leads to a desired shift to longer-lived investment.
Since myopic investors expect the cost of capital never to change in the future,
they find themselves desperately short of structures when costs fall in 1975.
Their one-period time horizon prevents them from delaying enough of their
investment to minimize adjustment costs efficiently, and leads to unrealisti-
cally sensitive investment demands. That is, they are assumed not to anticipate—22-
a decline in marginal q from its current high level.
Values of average q, as reported in Table 2c, reflect the pattern of
investment as well as tax law changes. Average q has generally declined over
the years as the distinction made by the tax system between old and new
capital has widened. Under a system of economic depreciation, average q would
equal marginal q net of the tax deduction of adjustment costs, as defined in
(6) (averaged over the two types of capital). At a steady state growth rate
of 3, a corporate tax rate of about 5O, and with structures comprising about
6O of total capital, the steady state value of average q will be 1.14 In
the short run, average q is determined both by the distinction between new and
old capital (the difference between average q and marginal q) and the value of
marginal q itself. A change in the incentive to invest will typically affect
both of these terms, sometimes in different directions.
Though the estimated time series given in Table 2c suggest that average q
for total capital was above one throughout the postwar period, it exceeded 1.14
only for the period before 1982. After the acceleration of depreciation
allowances in 1954, and throughout the 1950s and until 1981, average q remained
quite high. The mid-1960's investment boom -in particular contributed to marginal
q and therefore average q. Adverse macroeconomic conditions discourage invest-
ment in the 1980's, thereby lowering marginal q. Combined with the increased
gap between new and old capital brought about by ERTA, this moves average q
closer to one.
Table 3a presents effective tax rates for the perfect foresight
simulation. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2a, with
the exception that investment is steadier and so effective tax rates are—23-
jostled less by movements in marginal q.
Table 3b contains the perfect foresight investment series. Structures
investment is very smooth over the whole time period, generally declining from
1954 until the late 1960's, rising then and declining thereafter. The
presence of substantial joint adjustment costs raises the cost of structures
investment when firms are investing heavily in equipment, and this effect is
reflected in downward movements in structures investment rates for 1962 and
1972, years in which the investment tax credit was introduced. Similarly,
structures investment recovers in 1967, when the investment tax credit was
removed. Equipment investment follows the opposite pattern over theseyears,
and is subject to much wider investment swings generally. The persistence of
very high historical equipment investment over the period 1965-1969 as
reported in Table 1 is not reproduced in the equipment investment series in
Table 3b; simulated investment responds quickly to incentives in 1962 and
1964, but dies out much more quickly 'in subsequent years.
Table 3c reports average qs for this perfect foresight simulation. As in
the simulation with myopic expectations, average q follows a strong secular
drift downward over the whole time period. Other than for the effects of
strong investment and consequent high marginal qs in the mid-1960's, changes
in the tax system have over time progressively increased the distinction between
old and new capital in these runs.
The salient features of the historical investment pattern seem to be best
captured by the perfect foresight simulation. Besides the generally less
variable investment behavior it produces, its results for equipment -in the
mid—1970's and structures at the end of the 1970's are much closer to the actual—24-
investment pattern than is the case for the myopic simulation. Historical
equipment and structures investment remained strong through 1974, and then
declined in response to the recession. Investment in the myopic simulation
responds too quickly to the macroeconomic and tax law changes, while the perfect
foresight investors can see ahead to the next tax reform or phase in the
business cycle and so their investments show the same kind of smooth transitions
one finds in the historical series. Of course, the perfect foresight investment
series do not always match historical investment: at the end of the 1970's, for
example, perfect foresight investors know that ACRS is coming and would have
reduced equipment investment much more than was the case in reality. And
neither simulation run can explain the recent boom in equipment investment.14—25—
Effects of Historical Investment Policies
One of the most important investment incentives of the period under
consideration was the investment tax credit. While the investment tax credit
reduces the partial-equilibrium user cost of equipment, some authors have
suggested that the destabilizing effects of the credit over the business cycle
mitigated its investment incentive for equipment and reduced incentives for
structures investment.15
Table 4 presents investment series from a simulation in which it is
assumed that the government never instituted an investment tax credit. The
tax law is otherwise unchanged, and this run assumes that investors have
perfect foresight. Some of the results are predictable: equipment investment
rises much less quickly in 1962 and 1972 than it does in Table 3b. In
addition, equipment investment dies at the end of the 1970's when the
investment tax credit is not present to mitigate the effects of adverse
macroeconomic conditions.
The variance of equipment investment in this simulation is O.O24, which
is less than the O.O35 variance of investment reported in the perfect
foresight run (Table 3b) when the investment tax credit is present. While one
might be tempted to conclude that the investment tax credit was destabilizing,
such an interpretation depends on the sense in which stability is understood.
Mean equipment growth for the simulation reported in Table 4 is 2.86, which
is substantially less than the 3.4 growth rate reported in Table 3b. The
coefficient of variation for investment in the simulation with the tax credit
removed is 0.54, which is very close to the 0.55 coefficient of variation for-26--
investment in the historical law perfect foresight (Table 3b) simulation. It
appears, then, that in raising both the mean and variance of investment the
investment tax credit has not substantially changed -its relative stability. Of
course, it -ishardto know in a model like this one whether absolute or relative
stability is more appropriate in making welfare comparisons.
Table 5 presents investment series from simulations in which the
investment tax credit was never introduced and firms have myopic expectations
about future conditions. The mean growth rate of equipment is 3.54%, which is
higher than in the perfect foresight simulation but still smaller than
the 4.0% growth rate when investors receive the investment tax credit. The
variance of equipment investment is 0.047%, and the coefficient of variation
is 0.61. Thus, the relative stability of equipment investment in the absence of
an investment tax credit seems to be affected little by the nature of expec—
tations of future tax policies.
The introduction of ACRS in 1981 made new investment significantly more
attractive than it would have been under the prevailing AOR system. Table 6
presents simulation results which illustrate the effects of this legislative
change while holding the rest of the economic environment constant. In this
simulation investors have perfect foresight and ACRS is never introduced.
Equipment investment in Table 6 is significantly lower than corresponding
perfect-foresight equipment investment in Table 38 for the ACRS years, in par-
ticular 1981. and 1982. Because perfect-foresight investors correctly anticipate
and wish to smooth future adjustment costs, equipment investment in this run
falls off slightly from investment in Table 36 as early as 1966. In the absence
of ACRS, average annual equipment investment is somewhat lower and its variance—27—
marginally higher (since ACRS was -introduced at a time when macroeconomic con-
ditions were unfavorable to investment). The coefficient of variation for
equipment investment in this run is 0.59. Structures investment is less sharply
affected by the absence of ACRS. Structures investment in Table 6 is slightly
lower than that in Table 38 starting in 1959, and experiences a small drop in
1981.
High rates of -inflation may discourage investment by lowering the present
value of nominal depreciation allowances.16 Table 7 illustrates the effects of
rising inflation in the late 1960's and 1970's, by presenting results from a
perfect-foresight simulation in which depreciation allowances are indexed to
inflation starting in 1954. Equipment investment in Table 7 is substantially
higher over the period 1965-1974 than -it is in the perfect-foresight simulation
without indexing (Table 3B). Despite more generous depreciation allowances
under indexing, equipment investment in Table 7 is lower in the 1980's than is
the investment series in Table 38. This feature of Table 7 reflects the process
of adjustment from a higher capital stock, and is a further reminder of how
misleading static cost-of—capital calculations can be in explaining investment.
Equipment investment and its variance in Table 7 are somewhat higher than those
in Table 38, and have acoeff-icient of variation of 0.58. Structures investment
in Table 7 -is slightly higher than investment in Table 3B, but does not diverge
from the other series very much over any ranges.-28-
The Economic Effects of Tax Reform
In this section, we consider the impact on investment and firm value of
three tax reform proposals that have been seriously considered by the Congress
during the past year. The proposals share certain attributes but also have
their differences.
All three plans would repeal the investment tax credit. The first plan, the
Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax", would reduce the corporate tax rate to 30 percent
and provide assets with 250 percent declining balance depreciation over life-
times similar to those of the the asset depreciation range of the 1970s. The
second plan, proposed by President Reagan in May 1985 and generally referred to
as "Treasury II", would provide specified write-off patterns with comparable
lifetimes, fully indexed for inflation, and reduce the corporate tax rate to 33
percent.17 The third plan, passed by the House of Representatives and often
called the Rostenkowski plan after the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, would reduce the corporate tax rate to 36 percent and provide 200
percent declining balance depreciation with a switchover to straight-line,
indexed for half of all price level changes in excess of 5 percent per year.
Because all plans would remove the investment tax credit, one would expect
a shift in the mix of investment toward structures. The statutory rate reduc-
tions should contribute to increases in the value of corporate equity, though
the total impact on value of these plans will also depend on the as yet undeter-
mined effects on the overall incentive to invest.
In order to compare the effects of the plans, we simulate each starting
from the same initial conditions, and assuming that 1985 economic conditions-29--
(e.g., profitability and -inflation) will prevail in each subsequent year. The
particular assumptions made about previous behavior affect only the equipment
and structures capital stocks with which we begin. We assume that investors
behaved from 1954 through 1985 with perfect foresight, but expected the tax law
and economic conditions of 1985 to last forever.
In considering the effects of the plans, we must also make an assumption
about the behavior of interest rates. Since both corporate and personal tax
rates would fall under each plan, it is reasonable to expect that some decline
in before-tax interest rates would occur; how much is difficult to know wfthout
a more complete model of interest rate determination. Thus, we consider two
polar assumptions: that the real interest rate after-tax remains constant, and
that the real interest rate before-tax remains constant.
Table 8 shows the effects on investment of the plans. For comparison, we
present in the first column the -investment figures predicted for the case in
which no change -in policy occurs. Table 9 presents the corresponding values for
average q.
Table 8A, which presents results for the constant after-tax real interest
rate assumption, shows that, without any change in the tax law, investment would
be predicted to grow slowly over the next five years as a fraction of the capi-
tal stock but remain low. This is a continuation of the investment pattern that
should have occurred in recent years in response to the very high prevailing
real interest rates and low returns to capital. The growth simply reflects the
gradual approach back to the steady state investment level of 3 percent. The
corresponding values of marginal q in Table 9A mirror this slow growth in the
rate of investment.—30-
A switch to Bradley-Gephardt would increase the tax burden on equipment and
decrease that on structures. In the long run, the effective tax rate on equip-
ment would be 23 percent, that on strucures 26 percent, compared to 4 percent
and 31 percent, respectively, under present law. This results in a predicted
drop in equipment investment of 1.6 percent of the equipment capital stock, and
an increase of .5 percent in structures investment.By 1990, the aggregate
capital stock is predicted to be about 1.5 percent lower because of the change.
At the same time, the proposal is predicted to cause a jump in the stock market.
The average q for both equipment and structures rises substantially, with an
aggregate increase in market value of 26 percent! Over time, it continues to
increase as the level of aggregate investment recovers.
Under Treasury II, investment in both equipment and structures would fare
better than under the Bradley—Gephardt plan. Overall, investment would fall
very little, with long run effective tax rates of 18 percent on equipment and 23
percent on structures. Because of the higher corporate tax rate imposed,
Treasury II would also result in lower windfalls than under Bradley-Gephardt,
despite its more favorable impact on investment and marginal q.
The Rostenkowski plan would be less favorable for investment than either of
the other two proposals, imposing, in the long run, an effective tax rate of 31
percent on both equipment and structures. The larger rise in the equipment tax
burden, combined with the much lower adjustment costs associated with equipment,
leads to a sharp decline in equipment investment in 1986, with structures
investment behaving much as it did in the previous two simulations. Aggregate
fixed investment is predicted to drop by .9 percentage points in 1986 due to the
adoption of the plan. Given the size of the fixed corporate capital stock rela-—31-
tive to GNP, this translates into a drop in-investmentof just under six—tenths
of a percent of GNP and about 5 percent of gross nonresidential fixed invest-
ment. By 1990, the capital stock would be about 3.3 percent lower than under
current law.
Because it would lower the statutory tax rate the least, to 36 percent, and
because it decreases marginal q the most through reduced investment, this plan
would provide the smallest windfall to existing capital of the three plans. The
aggregate value of average q would rise by 16 percent, compared to 26 percent
under Bradley-Gephardt and 23 percent under Treasury II. Thus, the Rostenkowski
plan would raise more revenue from both new and old assets than would either of
the other plans.
The simulations presented in Tables 8B and 9B correspond to the assumption
of a fixed before-tax interest rate. The associated increase in after-tax
interest rates under the reform plans leads to further reductions in investment
and windfalls to old capital. Nevertheless, in no simulation does the windfall
fall below 7 percent of the market value of the capital stock, despite the quite
large declines in investment and marginal q that are predicted.—32-
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper illustrates the importance of anticipated
changes in taxes and other economic variables on investment behavior and firm
valuation. Simulation results suggest that postwar U.S. corporate investment
behavior can be understood as the outcome of a process in which investors
anticipate the general direction of future tax changes. To be sure, our
simple model of perfect foresight corporate investment does not explain all
the major movements in investment over this period. Yet the simulation runs
which explore the consequences of myopic investor expectations reveal how
poorly this modelling approach, which is standard in static models, performs
in a dynamic context.
The simulation experiments presented in this paper describe the likely
consequences of several alternatives to the historical pattern of corporate
taxation. We examine the effects of the investment tax credit by simulating
the last 25 years of firm behavior in its absence, and find that although the
tax credit increased the variance of equipment investment, it increased mean
equipment investment by even more. Of more pertinence to current policy
discussions, we also simulate the effects of two of the proposed tax reform
proposals. We find that both the Bradley-Gephardt and Rostenkowski corporate
tax plans would discourage investment and reduce the size of the corporate
capital stock relative to the effects of the current law. One of the advan-
tages of the model described in this paper is that we can use it to measure
the extent of the windfall gains enjoyed by old capital upon introduction of
these plans.—33-
Several important aspects of the determinants of corporate investment and
firm valuation remain poorly understood. The results in this paper make us
suspect that more attention needs to be devoted to the process by which
investors form expectations about future tax policy and macroeconomic con-
dit-ions.-34-
Appendix:
Aggregation of Depreciation Rates and Tax Parameters
What we seek are parameters for aggregate capital goods that, by some
measure, accurately reflect those of their components. One criterion that seems
reasonable is to require that, for a particular tax system, both net andgross
rates of return to capital before tax be the same for the aggregate assets as
for the sums of their components. A particular motivation for using this
approach is that it results in the effective tax rate, as usually measured,
being invariant to the aggregation procedure.
To see what weights this criterion dictates, consider first the special
case in which adjustment costs are zero and expectations are myopic. Let be
the fraction of capital stock j of the total in its class i (equipment or struc-
tures) at a particular date. (We suppress the time subscript but emphasize that
these capital stock weights are not time invariant.) The gross before tax
return to capital of type i is then:
(Al) = = Q.(r+ô.) (1-k.--Tz.)/(1-T)
where o,k3and z correspond to asset j. The net return is:
(42) r =-
Thus,the criterion would be satisfied by weighting the indvidual values of 6
by capital stock weights Q and the tax parameters k and z by f2(r+6); the tax
parameters of short-lived assets should be more heavily weighted. This is an
important choice, since the values of k÷Tz generally increase monotonically—35--
with 18
Since capital stock weights change over time, this formula would require
recomputation every year. However, this presents an index number problem, and
-it-is unclearthat we should prefer a measure with varying weights. Even after
this issue is resolved, one must deal with the problem of adjustment costs and
varying values of asset—specific q's, about which there is little information.
Finally, there is the problem of expectations. When the marginal product of
capital is dictated by expression (4), there are no simple weights (that we can
think of!) that satisfy the criterion. One would generally have to determine
the weights simultaneously with the solution for the marginal product itself,
which would make the problem intractable.
In light of the situation, we choose to weight 6 byand tax parameters by
Q(r+6), using fixed values for r and the capital stock weights ciovertime. The
capital stock weights used are for the year 1977, as described in Auerbach
(1983). The rates of economic depreciation come from calculations by Hulten and
Wykoff (1981). The fixed value used for r is .04.-36-
Notes
1.For ease of notation, we write A(.) as a function of alone rather
than all its arguments.
2. The constancy of itisnot assumed in our analysis, and is used here
only for the sake of simplicity. Some of the later simulations examine the
effect of allowing r to vary.
3. Note that net investment is simply the first difference of the capi-
tal stock.
4. This and other tax data used is described in Appendix A of Auerbach
(1983).
5. This would be true only if, among other things, the effective tax
rates on all forms of capital were equal, which they were not.
6. This assumption -is required if we are to consider the investment
decisions separately for structures and equipment.
7. This marginal product definition is required for 6 to be homogeneous
of degree one with respect to its inputs.
8. The internal consistency of this procedure can be verified by noting











(1-a1-a2)F}.Thus, the net returns to capital equal value
added less the competitive return to labor.
9. Denison (1979, p. 92) finds all factors and productivity changes
other than capital growth to contribute exactly 3.00% annually to the growth
of U.S. nonresidential business output over the period 1948—1973. While this
figure includes noncorporate businesses and would presumably be lower over the
period of the 1970's, it suggests that 396 is the most reasonable choice for
the exogenous growth rate of noncap-ital inputs.
10. These include the presence of returns to other factors in the firm's
market value, heterogeneity of the capital stock and the standard use of a tax
adjustment based on myopia of expectations about future changes in the tax
law. Some evidence -insupportof this comes from the finding by Abel and
Blanchard that the coefficient of investment on adjusted q rises substantially
when the variable is purged of that part of its variation estimated to have come
from fluctuations in the cost of capital (as opposed to profitability). In
addition, there has been very little work done which estimates separate adjust-
ment cost parameters for different types of capital; for an exploratory effort,
see Chirinko (1984).-37-
11. As Andrew Abel has pointed out, if actual investment series are
measured with noise then our calibration method will in general lead to adjust-
ment cost parameters which are smaller than the true parameters. However, our
resulting estimates are similar to those obtained from q investment equations,
which we believe to yield estimates that are biased upwards.
12. See the discussion in Auerbach and Hines (1986).
13. When expectations are nonmyopic, q' is defined consistently, with
future changes in ir taken into account.
14. Nor is it easily explained by the assumption that investors know that
one of the favorable tax reform proposals is imminent. In a perfect foresight
run (not reported here) in which it was known all along that the House Ways and
Means Committee proposal was to be adopted in 1986, equipment investment in 1985
-is only 1.3. This conclusion could be reversed, however, if investors only
recently learned of a forthcoming tax law change.
15. See, for example, Auerbach and Summers (1979).
16. Of course, inflation affects the incentive to invest through other
channels as well. See, for example, the discussions in Auerbach (1979),
Bradford (1981), and Hall (1981).
17. Also proposed as part of Treasury II was a recapture of "excess depre-
ciation" attributable to investors being able to take into the tax base at a 33
percent rate income deferred through accelerated depreciation under the current
46 percent tax rate. The provision would have raised an estimated 56.1 billion
dollars between fiscal years 1986 and 1989, equal to about 2 percent of the
value of the fixed corporate capital stock in present value. This provision is
not included in our calculations. If truly unanticipated, however, its inclu-
sion in our model would simply lead to a reduction in the 1986 value of average
q under Treasury II of about 2 percent, with no other impact. As the results
below suggest, this lump sum tax is quite small compared to the windfall gains
that Treasury II would produce overall for owners of existing assets.
18. We note in passing that if the rate of growth of the capital stock,
say g, equals the interest rate, then this latter set of weights corresponds
to using investment flow weights rather than capital stock weights.-38-
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investment 0.041% 0.0070% 0.012%
Year Equipment Structures Total
mean growth rateTABLE 2A


































1985 4 31TABLE 2B
INVESTMENT: MYOPIC EXPECTATIONS
Year Equipment Structures Total
1953 3.0 3.O 3.O
1954 3.6 3.2 3.3
1955 5.4 4.4 4.8
1956 3.3 4.6 4.1
1957 2.6 4.2 3.6
1958 1.9 2.7 2.4
1959 3.7 3.0 3.3
1960 2.7 2.3 2.4
1961 2.9 2.1 2.4
1962 6.8 2.9 4.4
1963 6.3 2.8 4.2
1964 6.9 3.0 4.5
1965 6.8 3.9 5.0
1966 5.8 4.4 5.0
1967 2.7 4.4 3.7
1968 4.4 5.3 4.9
1969 3.3 4.5 4.0
1970 0.4 4.2 2.7
1971 1.6 5.4 3.9
1972 6.5 4.0 4.9
1973 5.3 3.7 4.4
1974 1.7 6.7 4.7
1975 —3.3 15.3 8.2
1976 8.4 3.4 5.1
1977 7.1 4.5 5.4
1978 5.5 5.0 5.2
1979 4.4 3.9 4.1
1980 3.2 3.3 3.3
1981 4.6 2.6 3.3
1982 3.4 1.0 1.8
1983 3.6 1.1 2.0
1984 3.2 0.7 1.6
1985 3.0 0.7 1.6
mean growth rate 4.0 3.9 4.0%
variance of



































































































































Year Equipment Structures TotalTABLE 3A













































































































































































Investment 0.03596 0.006796 0.01296














































































































































































































































































investment 0.024% 0.0072% 0.012%
Year Equipment Structures Total
mean growth rateTABLE 5










































































































































investment 0.047% 0.0061% 0.017%











































































































































investment 0.038% 0.0082% 0.014%
Year Equipment Structures TotalTABLE 7










































































































































investment 0.041% 0.0068% 0.014%
Year Equipment Structures TotalTABLE 8A
TAX REFORM AND INVESTMENT
(Constant After-Tax Real Interest Rate)
Percentage Growth Rates of Capital Under Different Plans
Tax Regime
CurrentLaw Rostenkowski























































































TAX REFORM AND INVESTMENT
(Variable After-Tax Real Interest Rate)
Percentage Growth Rates of Capital Under Different Plans
TaxRegime
CurrentLaw Rostenkowski























































































TAX REFORM AND MARKET REPLACEMENT COST
(Constant After-Tax Real Interest Rates)


























































































TAX REFORM AND MARKET REPLACEMENT COST
(Variable After-Tax Real Interest Rates)
Percentage of Market Value of Capital to Replacement Cost
Tax Regime
CurrentLaw Rostenkowski


















































Equip.Struc. Total Equip. Struc. Total
0.85
0.98
0.98
0.99
1 .00
1.02
1.11
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.23
1.24
1.01
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.16
0.85
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.96
1.11
1.18
1 .18
1.19
1.20
1.20
1.01
1.11
1.11
1.11
1.11
1.11